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Assessing Responsibility:
Fixing Blame versus Fixing Problems’
John T. Sanders
In the midst of even the most tragic circumstances attending the
aftermath of disaster, and co-existing with a host of complex emotions,
arises a practical consideration: how might similar tragedies be pre-
vented in the future? The complexity of such situations must not be
neglected. More than mere prevention must usually be taken into
consideration. But the practical question is of considerable importance.
In what follows, I will offer some reasons for being concerned that
efforts to fur the problem-efforts, that is, directed toward insuring that
similar tragedies do not occur in the future-can easily be obstructed by
attempts to fuc blame-that is, efforts directed toward determining which
agent among those involved is guilty of Gong-doing. This is the case,
I shall contend, even where some agent or another really is guilty of
wrong-doing.’The problem is further complicated by a pervasive
human tendency to imagine that some agent or another must be re-
sponsible in some way for any tragedy that occurs-even when this is
not really true-but its influence is not at all limited to such cases.
As I shall suggest, philosophical attitudes toward issues of deter-
minism and free will may be implicated in the different approaches
people take to the problem of assessing what has gone wrong in a
particular case and how to fuc it, but such deep philosophical problems
need not be resolved here. The point is not that humans are never
guilty of wrong-doing (since their actions, the argument might go, are
all products of outside forces), but rather that wharever he case may
be about guilt, tracking down guilty persons is a different business from
fling institutionally-embedded problems so as to lessen the likelihood
of their recurrence.
Because it has received such widespread attention, I shall take as
my illustrative example the case of the Challenger disaster. But I
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presume that the lessons learned from consideration of this case could
just as well be applied elsewhere.The situation is the same, I think,
for assessing what went wrong at Three Mile Island, at the Kansas City
Hyatt-Regency hotel, or in the cases of the DC-10 cargo door locks or
the Pinto gas tanks?
Whether blame and censure should be attached to particular
individuals or not in any such case is one thing, I shall argue, and what
may be done to prevent similar events in the future is quite another.
Failure fully to appreciate this often leads to a confusion of the two
issues, and to a tendency to feel that the practical concern for
prevention is taken care of once culpable human beings have been
replaced. This is more often than not a mistake.
Whatever social, legal, or corporate action may be required in
cases where human failure really is part of the problem, it is rarely the
case that that is UN that is going on. Agents with bad or even malicious
judgment have the effects that they do because of specific circum-
stances in their social and, institutional settings. Attempts to fw the
problem must focus on these institutional circumstances, since even
when a culpable agent is removed the setting remains the same, waiting
for another agent to occupy the slot. Unless the degree of culpability
in a particular case is plainly unusual or outrageous, one can imagine
that so long as the institutional circumstances are not adjusted, the
potential for future similar disasters remains.
In those cases where almost anyone would act similarly in a par-
ticular institutional situation, agents are actually being set up. In the
cases, assessments of guilt may very well be mistaken and the right
conclusion may be that no one is to blame, even though we may be
able to take steps to change the setting and thus fur the problem.4
It is not so much that the characteristic features of the institu-
tional settings are ignored in common analyses, but rather that they are
frequently overwhelmed by attempts to nail down just which person or
persons must finally be assigned blame!
For all the care that may be exerted in understanding the
pressures, the unique perspectives,the special responsibilities and
circumstances-and perhaps, in many cases, the temptations-that have
roles to play in the real making of decisions, it is too easy to abandon
the wisdom involved in seeing these factors as important in favor of a
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not-so-wise capitulation to the general need to find a culprit. Re-
grettably, analyses that do not pick out guilty human agents may very
well appear to many-for that reason alone-to be too soft, too forgiving.
This attitude seriously obstructs the project of fling he problems
in question in a number of ways. To see this, it is useful to turn to a
specific example, not only of a particular disaster, but of a particular
analysis of a disaster.6
The Challenger Incident
In an excellent recent paper,’ Patricia Werhane offers the following
suggestion:
. . . [T]he Challenger incident was a result of at least four
kinds of difficulties: differing perceptions and priorities of
the engineers and management at Thiokol and at NASA, a
preoccupation with roles and role responsibilities on the part
of engineers and managers, contrasting corporate cultures at
Thiokol and its parent, Morton, and a failure both by
engineers and by managers to exercise individual moral
responsibility.’
Werhane begins by offering a very nice capsule sketch of the
history of the shuttle booster’s O-rings. The key points are these: from
even the earliest stages of booster development, concern about the
strength and the flexibility of the O-rings was widespread among
Morton Thiokol engineers. As successive shuttle flights mounted up,
these concerns appear to have been put somewhat to the side. It
seems that the absence of outright failure of the O-rings in the many
successful shuttle flights before Challenger gave many people the
impression that the safety of the boosters was adequate.More
particularly, damage to the O-rings was evident in the earlier flights,
but this was not regarded as outside the boundaries set by concern for
safety. After seventeen successful flights, in fact, the manager of the
solid rocket booster project for NASA at the Marshall Space Center
suggested that damage to the O-rings was “accepted and indeed
expected-and no longer considered an anomaly.‘”
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By January of 1986, the Morton Thiokol engineers had become
especially concerned about the performance of the O-rings at very low
temperatures. On the 27th. the day before the launch, the weather was
cold and the next day was supposed to be even colder. The launch had
already been delayed several times, however, and constant launch
delays in NASA’s schedule had tainted the entire space shuttle
program. Another delay was thus to be avoided if it was~not really
necessary. It was under these circumstances that somewhere between
14 and 22 engineers in the solid fuel rocket unit of Morton Thiokol
formally protested against the launch. They directed their protests
both to their own corporate bosses and to NASA directly. The
manager of the engineering-design team refused to sign a needed go-
ahead release for the launch.
The vice president of engineering at Morton Thiokol initially
supported his engineers, and refused to agree to the launch. He was
an engineer himself. But NASA was arguing that there was no sound
evidence on which to base the concern about O-ring performance at
cold temperatures, and upon being asked to take off his engineering
hat and put on his management hat, this official “capitulated” and
agreed to the launch.
Werhane shows considerable sensitivity to many of the institu-
tional pressures that bore upon several of the actors in this drama. She
is also cautious to observe that the demands we make on specialists-
she makes special mention of specialists in engineering and in
management-may require that they make use of different methods and
take different things to be important as they make judgments about the
world. They have, after all, different objectives in most cases. Special
concern is devoted to different methods of assessing risk, since in the
Challenger story managers appear to have assessed the risk of launch
differently from the engineers, but the issue is considerably more
pervasive than that. As Werhane puts it,
We all perceive and deal with the world through a per-
spective or set of perspectives, we each run our ‘camera’ of
the world through certain selective mechanisms: intentions,
interests, desires, points of view, or biases, all of which work
as selective and restrictive tilters. That is, we each have
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what I shall call our own metaphysical movies of the world.
These are metaphysicnl movies because they entail pro-
jections of one’s perspective on whatever is the given data of
experience.They are analogous to movies, because, like
movies, each of our perspectives varies from stark realism to
fantasy and even error, and because, like movies, the
selective process leaves a great deal of the data of experience
‘on~ the cutting room floor.“”
Werhane uses this device of “metaphysical movies,” finally, to
highlight the fact that different people perceive things differently, that
sometimes this is a function of the role they are playing in a given
circumstance, and that people can occasionally find themselves in
situations where the different ways they perceive things in their own
several different roles-their different metaphysical movies-may come
into internal conflict. This, she ~argues, is part of what happened to
various people in the Challenger incident:
. [I]n the Challenger case organizational structure, cor-
porate culture, engineering and managerial habits, and role
responsibilities precipitated events contributing to the
Challenger disaster. At the same time, a number of indivi-
duals at Morton Thiokol and NASA were responsible for the
launch failure. Differing world views, conflicting priorities of
the engineers and managers on this project, and the failure
of either engineers or management to take personal respon-
sibility for decision-making contributed significantly to the
event.”
All of this, I take it, is probably correct. And Werhane may very
well be right when she points to’particular individuals as having born
special responsibility for what happened-it may be that these people
should have acted differently. Werhane offers the suggestion that a
“television” test might help us .all in such situations: we should make
only those decisions that we would be proud to defend in public as well
as to our colleagues.
What is troublesome in all of this, though, is that a promising line
of trouble-shooting analysis appears to get abandoned as soon as we
78 Business & Professional Ethics Journal
have tracked down the culprits.I* The “metaphysical movie” analysis-
while some might not really want to give it this particular name-offers
a way of understanding how things might have looked from the inside.
Sometimes it is bound to be the case that the reason that a particular
person looks at things as being embedded within a particular frame-
work involves, in a fundamental way, the fact that they are in that
particular position. One can predict, for example, that people will feel
defensive if they are being accused of inefficiency, as NASA was. One
can thus predict that the consequences of not launching would neces-
sarily loom large for anyone wearing a “managerial” hat. Were lives at
risk here? Of course they were. They were for aIl the launches. And
every launch so far had been successful. But this launch was different:
the temperature was significantly lower than at any previous launch
time and the engineers were recommending that the launch be
scrubbed.
Yes, the circumstances were different. NASA then asked the
engineers to substantiate their concerns. But the flexibility of O-rings
had never beerr officially tested below 47 degrees, and apparently no
one took seriously the results of less formal experiments like the one
performed so dramatically offer the tragedy by Richard Feynman,
before a presidential investigative commission and national television
camerasI So the engineers hesitated, and when the decision to go
ahead with the launch was made, they did not think it the right course
to blow the whistle. One suspects that, as risky as they may have
thought the O-rings to be, they were not as certain as they would have
liked to be about what exactly the risk wus.
I am not sure that metaphors of different hats and different meta-
physical movies help here. As useful as such images may be in o e
circumstances, they yield the suggestion that, by virtue of being a
manager, say, one is bound to see things differently than would an
engineer. But when the Morton Thiokol engineering vice president was
asked to think like a manager, he “capitulated.” And when the engi-
neers were asked to substantiate their concerns, they appear to have
felt helpless. Could it be that anyone-even an engineer (or a pro-
fessional ethicist, for that matter)-who thought deeply about what was
at stake for NASA and for Morton Thiokol if the launch were delayed
yet aguin-might have looked one more time at those risky O-rings, and
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wondered again about how serious that risk was? The risks to NASA
and Morton’ Thiokol of g ing head with the launch were, as events
tragically proved, considerable.Do s one have to be an ngineer to
appreciate this?
The Genesis of Perspective
I submit that if uny of us were in that situation, under those pressures,
we would have found either decision very difficult. This is an artifact
of the situation. And it may even be that, if any one of us were in the
place of the engineers who “capitulated,” freighted with all the responsi-
bilities and pressures that it was in fact freighted with, we foe would
have made the same decision. It is important, as one considers this
possibility, t,o make sure that all the pressures and responsibilities and
available information are taken into consideration.
What is missing-or at least underemphasized-from the different
hats/different movies line of thinking is a certain key fact: there are
reasons why different professional hats and different individual
perspectives have their various characters. This is not at all arbitrary.
Managers look at things in a certain characteristic way in large part
because of the character of the typical kinds of projects they undertake.
The same is true for engineers and philosophers and everyone else.
Asking someone to put on a different hat is really just a way of asking
that certain considerations be taken into account. And while there are
individual differences in how easy this is to do,‘most of us can do it to
some extent, at least with help. And the more considerations that get
thrown into the pot, the tougher decisions become.
If we want to know how to fuc institutional frameworks in such a
way as to prevent repetitions of problems that have arisen, we must
pursue the details of the lines of influence that motivate people as far
as we can. Did someone at some juncture make a decision that was
influenced too much from one direction and not enough from another?
We must ask why that was. Were there institutional pressures that
made it likely that any person trying to act responsibly in just that
position would do the same?
One must track these things down as precisely as possible if one
wants to get to the bottom of such events as the Challenger disaster.
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To offer an overly simplistic suggestion, if there is a consensusChat the
safety of the crew is a fvted point, to be the main driver of all decisions
concerning space shuttle launches, then it may be best to enforce that
consensus by requiring that launches be approved by some agency
carefully protected from the normal pressures found within NASA or
within its contractors. If the consensus is something short of that, then
some other solution may offer itself. But only when we have a clear
picture of w1ty the “metaphysical movies” of the individual actors looked
just the way they did will we have clues about what really went wrong.
None of this implies that people are never to be held morally
responsible for their actions, or ever to be fired or otherwise penalized
for doing wrong. It is admittedly true that putting on the institutional
analyst’s hat makes it difficult to see things in quite the same way one
might while wearing the legal theorist’s hat-not to mention the police
officer’s or the government prosecutor’s hats. But the institutional
analyst might very well be able to offer a plausible necessary condition
for findings of genuine guilt in these situations: it is plausible to find a
persongnilry of wrong-doing only if it is not the case that nyone acting
resnorrsibly in his position would have done the same.14 Thus, if
disaster oc&rs because of a decision made by someone who agonized
over it and tried hard to make the right decision, and did not culpably
neglect information that was realistically obtainable, then the person
ought not be held guilty.
Werhane certainly takes this into consideration. Yet she appears
to think the evidence shows that at least some of the actors do not
meet this criterion. Here is her reason, for example, for thinking that
the engineers should have blown the whistle after management had
decided to go ahead with the launch:
The problem is that we become enmeshed in our own
movies of the world, in our roles, our idealizations, and in
institutional structures in which our decisions take place.
Seldom do we stand back and evaluate not merely a decision
but the perspective out of which that decision is being
generated, the institutional and social structure in which it
occurs, our roles, and the limits of those roles in the larger
context of moral decision-making. The engineers in this case
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identified themselves with their role responsibilities. They
did not take a more general account of the decision about
which they were intimately informed and connected. They
allowed themselves to be ‘managed’ and did not think care-
fully about their primary duties, the duty to consider first
safety and welfare.Is Nor did they reevaluate their responsi-
bilities in the context of the new company, Morton, with a
set of open door policies that were in contrast to Thiokol’s.
They too, then, are responsible.16
Perhaps this is correct. But can one be so sure that they did not
consider things more generally? And if they d d do so, is it really so
obvious that they would have acted differently? Or even that they
should have acted differently? One needs to know more about how
things looked from there. And if we are so sure that the wrong
decision was made, then the least we can do in the name of prevention
is to alter the institutional setting so that it is less likely that people
trying to behave responsibly will make that decision, or that it is
available as an option for people acting less than honorably in that
position.
The method urged by Werhane-careful consideration of the entire
institutional fabric within which decisions get made-is the right one for
pursuing the practical questions about future prevention that arise out
of tragedy. The positions in. any complex social situation are often
freighted with stresses and pressures, opportunities and temptations.
These things require at least as much attention-and in many ways
attention of the same kind-as do O-rings. Perhaps there are idio-
syncratic problems with the particular individual who occupies some
particular sensitive position, and surely it is proper to assign guilt in
some cases. But one makes a serious mistake-one with potentially
severe ethical implications-if one underestimates the possibility that
any position-holder, given stresses and pressures objectively obtaining
in the particular position in question, might have “failed” like an O-ring.
Where fhaf is the case, the best solution will clearly be in the direction
of relieving those characteristic stresses and pressures.
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Notes
1. This paper was read and discussed at the Second Annual
Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, held
at the University of Maryland in March of 1993. It has benefited from
suggestions made by members of the audience, and especially by
comments made there and elsewhere by Robert Baum, Paul Petersen,
Victoria Varga, Aarne V silind, Vivian Weil and Patricia Werhane.
2. I do not wish to deny, of course, that problems someti es may
be fixed precisely by finding culprits or incompetents and dealing with
them-either by removing them from their positions or by finding ways
of correcting their behavior. I am arguing only that this need not be
the case. Indeed, as may be evident in what follows, I am of the
opinion that such a situation is less common than one might think.
Considerable attention has been devoted to the related idea that, in
many cases where individuals within corporations or other large
organizations are more or less naturally led to make bad decisions
because of institutional set-ups, it is the organization itself that may be
held morally responsible.See, for example, Peter French, “The
Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16,
1979, 207-15. Surely this is correct. But this will not’always be the
case, and even where it is, the enterprise of fing blame must still be
distinguished from the enterprise of fling problems. For a sustained
example of how French’s thesis concerning the moral culpability of
corporations may be brought to bear in a particular case, see his “What
is Hamlet to McDonnell-Douglas or McDonnell-Douglas to Hamlet:
DC-lo,” Business & Professional Ethics Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1982,
1-13. As French reminds his readers, “our first interest is with the
ascription of moral responsibility to McDonnell-Douglas” (p. 5). It is
not, therefore, his purpose to decide whether localizing blame in this
way will help to prevent future problems of the kind he analyzes.
3. Indeed, the same case can be made in all kinds of situations
where institutions (and people in them) are trying both to fur blame
and to fK problematic institutional arrangements. Sometimes people
will argue about which of these is the r ghr approach to take, as if
they were somehow mutually exclusive. Thinking of the matter in this
way misses the point. The two approaches merely reflect different
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concerns, and they need not be in conflicf at all. It is just that one ap-
proach serves one kind of purpose, the other approach serves another
kind of purpose. For discussion of some of this in connection with
attempts by universities to control their research policies, see Wade L.
Robison and John T. Sanders, “The Myths of Academia: Open Inquiry
and Funded Research,” in the Journal of College and University Low,
Vol. 19, No. 3,1993, and Sanders and Robison, “Research Funding and
the Value-Dependence of Science,” in Business and Professional Ethics
Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1992. It was in connection with these issues,
and particularly in connection with discussion arising as ’result of
revelations about research and funding relationships between my own
institution and the CIA, that I first became sensitized to the dangers of
focussing too much attention on fling blame.
4. There may then be some agent who has a responsibility for
taking these steps. And if those steps aren’t taken, we may have yet
another problem to examine. Here we come upon one more thing that
we may have in mind when we speak of “assessing responsibility” in
tragic circumstances. It is actually the third that has come up in the
paper. They are: 1) trying to figure out what went wrong (this may or
may not involve a culpable agent, although it will probably involve
agents and their actions); 2) trying to figure out who is to blame;
3) trying to figure out whose business it is to figure out what went
wrong, and/or to take steps to frx things. As an aside, it is worth
noting that it may be among the ethical responsibilities of professional
ethical analysts to keep these several sorts of assessment straight as
they name names in their papers.
5. The same may hold for the institutions in which people in such
situations find themselves caught up. As Peter French writes, “If
Mary’s doing b is a natural or (within some organizational structure)
a required response to John’s doing a, we usually hold only John
primarily accountable for the harm (or John and the organization). . .”
(“What is Hamlet to McDonnell-Douglas,” p. 4). The same is true if
organizational names get substituted for Mary’s and ~John’s. And if
these relationships-whether among individuals or institutions or a com-
bination of both-appear to be arranged in webs rather than in the
chains that French seems to be thinking of, the effect is an institutional
structure which yields harmful results that are no one’s fault.
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6. The case I have chosen to use as an example is chosen in part
because it is almost surely the single best documented case in the
literature. A great deal is known about the details of crucial decisions,
about conversations among decision makers, and about pressures and
problems that attended the entire process that led to the fatal launch
of the Challenger on January 28, 1986. Further, there is fairly wide-
spread consensus concerning these things. These facts,. which might
seem as if they ought to facilitate my argument in behalf of a
distinction between the sorts of analysis suited to fling blame and
those better suited to flingproblems, can actually complicate the task.
This is especially true where people have developed settled views con-
cerning what, precisely, went wrong. I am especially grateful to Vivian
Weil for helping me appreciate the extent to which one needs to be
sensitive to this in approaching the Challenger case.
7. Patricia H. Werhane,“Engineers and Management: The
Challenge of the Challenger Incident,” 77le Journal of Business Ethics,
Vol. 10, No. 8, 1991, 605-16. Werhane’s paper does a singularly tine
job of assessing the many institutional factors that surrounded the fatal
decision to go ahead with the launch of Challenger, in spite of a
virtually unanimous engineering recommendation-from the engineers
at Morton Thiokol who had designed the rocket boosters-that air
temperatures were far too low to be confident about the “O-rings”
which sealed the joint connecting the booster segments. The engineers
actually had more concerns than just this, but the O-ring concern was
high on their list.
8. Werhane, op. cit., p. 605.
9. Quoted in Werhane, p. 606.
10. Werhane, p. 607. I think this is all perfectly right, as far as it
goes. See for example, John T. Sanders, “Experience, Memory and
Intelligence,” 77te Monist, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1985, and “Merleau-Ponty,
Gibson, and the Materiality of Meaning,” Ma  and World, Vol., 26
No. 3, 1993.
11. Werhane, p. 605.
12. The impression that fixing blame becomes the primary task of
the paper is supported by the tenor of Joseph Herkert’s response to
Werhane. He argues that she is wrong about how blame should be
futed. See Herkert, “Management’s Hat Trick: Misuse of ‘Engineering
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Judgment’ in the Challenger Incident,” Journal of Business Efhics,
Vol. 10, No. 8, 1991, 617-20.
13. Feynman, at one of the public hearings devoted to determining
the facts in the Challenger story, dropped some of the O-ring material
into a glass of ice water. Its diminished flexibility was quite obvious.
It is not, of course, that one needs to be a Nobel laureate in physics to
think such things up. But it might have helped a great deal that Feyn-
man was not, in his capacity as curmudgeonly investigator, under quite
the same pressure as the Morton-Thiokol engineers. In connection
with the general hypothesis that others did not think to perform this
simple little experiment before Feynman did, however, it is intriguing
that Feynman later came to believe that his work on the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident was consider-
ably less independent than he had thought at the time: “I found out
later that when I thought I was doing something independently I was
being worked . . .operated by somebody else who wanted to get some-
thing done without involving himself, and so forth . . those guys are
clever, you know? I think I’m running around on my own hook, getting
a clue here and a clue there, but those clues were just little taps to
make me run in the right directton . . . I was being had to a certain
extent.” One can’t help but wonder what was going on here. The
quotation from Feynman is taken from an episode of television’s Nova
series, available as Coronet Video #5920CVHS, “Nbva: Last Journey
of a Genius” (Northbrook, Illinois: Coronet Film & Video, 1989).
14. Interestingly, it may be that some of the differences between a
focus on fixing blame and a focus on fling problems parallel
differences between what Carol Gilligan calls the “ethics of rights” and
the “ethics of care.”See especially Gilligan, In a Different Voice
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1982). Hints about applications of
an “ethics of care” to problems arising in professional contexts may be
gleaned from Sara Ann Reiter, “The Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy:
Lessons for Accounting Ethics Education,” unpublished manuscript.
15. I want to make two remarks in passing concerning this part of
the passage: 1) there is some confusion here about what the real prob-
lem is supposed by Werhane to be. Is it that the engineers didn’t look
at things generally enough? Or is it that they did not look at it
sufficiently in the way that engineers, in particular, are supposed to (in
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terms of their “primary duties”)?2) Which things are the “primary
duties” of engineers may not be as clear as Werhane indicates. See, for
example, John T. Sanders, “Honor Among Thieves: Some Reflec-
tions on Professional Codes of Ethics,” Professional Ethics, Vol. 3,
Nos. 3 & 4, 1994. For an appropriately cautious argument concerning
the question of whether engineers have extraordinary obligations, see
Andrew Oldenquist’s “Commentary” to Kenneth D. Alpern’s “Moral
Responsibility for Engineers.”Both pieces are in the Business &
Professional Erhics Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1983, 39-51.
16. Werhane, op. cit., p. 613.
